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Since the Vietnam War,
policymakers have worried that the U.S. public will support military opera-
tions only if the human costs of the war, as measured in combat casualties, are
minimal.1 A combination of circumstances makes the public response to the
ongoing war in Iraq during the presidential campaign of 2003–04 an important
opportunity to evaluate this hypothesis. First, the war in Iraq is both the most
controversial and most deadly U.S. military operation since the Vietnam War.
By Election Day in November 2004, nearly 1,200 U.S. soldiers had been killed
in action. At the same time, Americans seemed increasingly divided over Pres-
ident George W. Bush’s reasons for going to war; both the Kay report and the
9/11 commission report raised questions about the strength of the ties between
Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the al-Qaida ter-
rorist network.2 Moreover, the public was deluged with information about the
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1. Unless otherwise noted, we use the term “casualties” to refer to “deaths.” We recognize that in
military parlance, casualties means dead and wounded, a much higher number in any conºict. In
popular usage, however, the word “casualties” has generally meant those who died while per-
forming their mission. In our own polling, except where noted, we used “deaths” in all relevant
question wordings so our claims are not contaminated by any public confusion about the terms. In
this article we look only at one aspect of the cost equation—”U.S. military deaths in combat,” or
“our casualties.”
2. The Kay report is not ofªcially published in any single document. David Kay submitted an in-
terim report from the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, on October 2, 2003, but he resigned prior to submitting a ªnal re-
port. His most inºuential public statement on the ISG’s ªndings was his testimony to the Senate
Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004, following his decision to resign from the ISG. For
a transcript of Kay’s October 2, 2003, testimony, see http://cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/
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war and its cost in American lives. Combat in Iraq was the most covered story
on the major network television news broadcasts in 2004 with nearly twice as
many minutes of airtime as the second most covered story: postwar recon-
struction of Iraq.3
In this article, we argue that the public will tolerate signiªcant numbers of
U.S. combat casualties under certain circumstances. To be sure, the public is
not indifferent to the human costs of American foreign policy, but casualties
have not by themselves driven public attitudes toward the Iraq war, and
mounting casualties have not always produced a reduction in public support.
The Iraq case suggests that under the right conditions, the public will continue
to support military operations even when they come with a relatively high hu-
man cost.
Our core argument is that the U.S. public’s tolerance for the human costs of
war is primarily shaped by the intersection of two crucial attitudes: beliefs
about the rightness or wrongness of the war, and beliefs about a war’s likely
success. The impact of each attitude depends upon the other. Ultimately, how-
ever, we ªnd that beliefs about the likelihood of success matter most in deter-
mining the public’s willingness to tolerate U.S. military deaths in combat.
Our ªndings imply that the U.S. public makes reasoned and reasonable
judgments about an issue as emotionally charged and politically polarizing as
ªghting a war. Indeed, the public forms its attitudes regarding support for the
war in Iraq in exactly the way one should hope they would: weighing the costs
and beneªts. U.S. military casualties stand as a cost of war, but they are a cost
that the public is willing to pay if it thinks the initial decision to launch the war
was correct, and if it thinks that the United States will prevail.
We explore the public’s tolerance for casualties through a close examination
of polling data from the beginning of the Iraq war through the 2004 U.S.
election—that is, for the ªrst twenty months of the war. Of course, the Iraq war
has continued since, and by the winter of 2005, U.S. public opinion on the war
had shifted somewhat. Consider just one, oft-quoted statistic: in April 2003 at
the height of “major combat operations,” 76 percent of the public approved of
International Security 30:3 8
2003/david_kay_10022003.html. For a transcript of Kay’s January 28, 2004, testimony, see http://
www.ceip.org/ªles/projects/npp/pdf/Iraq/kaytestimony.pdf. For a complete review of the con-
troversy over Iraqi WMD programs leading up to the Iraq war, see http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/index.html. See The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).
3. For the Tyndall Report summary of 2004 campaign coverage, see http://www.tyndallreport
.com.
President Bush’s handling of the war; by the time of the U.S. election in
November 2004, that number had dropped to 47 percent; a year later, it had
dropped below 35 percent.4
This movement in public opinion in a conºict that remains ongoing as this
article goes to press might lead some to discount an argument tested primarily
on data from the ªrst twenty months of the war. Dismissing our ªndings in
this way is unwarranted for at least two reasons. First, this article is advancing
a model of the structure of public opinion, not simply describing the relatively
high level of public support that existed in certain stages of the war. Our
model can be assessed based on twenty months of data and then, if supported,
applied to new data as they come available. We believe that the noticeable de-
cline in public support in 2005 ªts our model rather well. In our view, public
support has not eroded in 2005 because of mounting casualties per se. After
all, the United States suffered about the same number of casualties between
March and July 2005—a period of marked decline in support—as it did during
the months from June through October 2004—when support was on the rise.
Support hit a peak, moreover, in January 2005 despite large numbers of U.S.
casualties in November and December 2004. Instead, we believe that the de-
cline in public support for the war reºects the mounting death toll combined
with a perceived lack of measurable progress toward “success” that eroded the
public’s hopes that the war may eventually be won. Public support for the war
in January 2005 clearly reºected public optimism in the wake of the strikingly
successful Iraqi election that month. Since that time, however, we would argue
that political deadlock over the drafting of a constitution, a lack of demonstra-
ble progress regarding the efªcacy of Iraqi security forces, and the persistence
of deadly attacks by insurgents undermined that optimism. Of course, the re-
sults of the October 15, 2005, referendum on the Iraqi constitution and the sub-
sequent national election will also need to be factored into the mix. Our model
claims that public estimations of the success of those milestones—and the abil-
ity of insurgents to react—will further shape public tolerance for the war.
Second, truncating the time-series to stop in November 2004 does not bias
our results in favor of our model. Our time-series data are long enough to
cover factors that might be considered competing arguments: the shock of es-
calating casualties to a level ten times the number suffered during the period
of major combat operations; the shock of the failure to ªnd large stockpiles of
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4. The 2003 and 2004 data are from a national sample of adults as sampled by Gallup; 2005 data
are from a comparable survey by CBS News. As reported on http://www.pollingreport.com.
WMD; and the shock of a bitter partisan debate over the Iraq war in the con-
text of a close-fought presidential election. These are precisely the elements
pundits cite for explaining the erosion of U.S. public support for the war in
2005. Often these same pundits were claiming that these very factors would
cause a collapse of public support in 2004. Of course, our argument should be
continuously tested against new data and, indeed, our ªndings raise many
new questions that warrant further study. But we have ample data to reach a
conclusion that is likely to withstand the test of time.
Our argument proceeds in four stages. First, we clarify our understanding of
casualty sensitivity and place our work in the context of the extensive research
on this topic. Second, through an analysis of weekly presidential approval rat-
ings from January 2003 until November 2004, we ªnd that the public’s willing-
ness to tolerate casualties and continue to support the president varies
substantially depending upon the context in which the casualties occur. Third,
we examine the factors that shape the public’s tolerance for casualties through
an analysis of individual-level attitudes toward casualties and the war in Iraq.
Fourth, because our argument identiªes “expectations of success” as the key
factor in shaping public casualty sensitivity, we explore how the public deªnes
success in Iraq and what indicators the public trusts for measuring whether
success is likely or not.
Conceptions of Casualty Sensitivity
Casualty sensitivity differs from casualty phobia, a reºexive opposition to any
casualties. Following Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, casualty sensitivity
recognizes the human toll as a cost of war.5 The public would always like to as-
sume less of this cost, but a nonzero human cost does not mean that it will op-
pose war. Casualty sensitivity is, to put it crudely, one’s price sensitivity to the
human cost of war. As with other forms of price sensitivity, some members of
the public are more sensitive to the costs than others. We see in the public a
continuum of casualty sensitivity ranging from the minimally sensitive—those
who view casualties as a necessary cost of war and not a determining factor in
shaping support—to the maximally sensitive—those who support only mili-
tary missions that guarantee virtually no casualties.
Casualty phobia represents one end of this continuum, and in these terms,
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5. Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations
and the Use of Force (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
the conventional wisdom since the Vietnam War has been that the U.S. public
is best thought of as casualty phobic. Analysts of U.S. public opinion, however,
have not generally endorsed this conventional view. The scholarly consensus
has evolved over time and can perhaps best be understood as three interlock-
ing (but not necessarily successive) debates.
The ªrst debate concerns whether the number of casualties affects public
support for war according to a ªxed pattern of inexorable decline or whether
the public views casualties and the use of force through a cost-beneªt calculus.
Early research during the Vietnam War emphasized what came to be called the
“rally ‘round the ºag” effect. Viewed this way, public casualty sensitivity was
not a debilitating constraint on U.S. military power.6
In a pioneering analysis of public opinion regarding Vietnam, Jeffrey
Milstein and William Mitchell found that public support dropped as the
U.S. military commitment expanded and as casualties increased, whereas pub-
lic support climbed when the burden was shifted to the shoulders of the
Vietnamese themselves.7 John Mueller built on this work with a landmark
study of public opinion on the Vietnam War (with a comparison to the Korean
War).8 Mueller is famous for arguing that public support for the Vietnam War
dropped in proportion to the log of casualties.9 Viewed in toto, Mueller’s ªnd-
ing does not support the casualty-phobia thesis. However, Mueller was argu-
ing that public support dropped reºexively, and more to the point, inexorably.
His oft-quoted study thus ªxed in the public mind the idea that support for
Vietnam buckled as the body bag toll mounted, and this gradually hardened
into the conventional wisdom that the public is reºexively casualty phobic.
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6. See Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul
Ekman, and Gordon S. Black, “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 61, No. 1 (June 1967), pp. 317–333; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic
Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).
7. Jeffrey S. Milstein and William C. Mitchell, “Dynamics of the Vietnam Conºict: A Quantitative
Analysis and Computer Simulation,” Peace Research Society (International) Papers, No. 10 (1968);
Jeffrey S. Milstein, “Changes in Domestic Support and Alternative Military Actions in the Vietnam
War, 1965–1968,” paper delivered at the Twenty-third Annual Meeting of the Western Political Sci-
ence Association, April 3, 1969; Jeffrey S. Milstein, “The Vietnam War from the 1968 Tet Offensive
to the 1970 Cambodian Invasion,” in H.R. Alker, K.W. Deutsch, and A.H. Stoetzel, Mathematical
Approaches to Politics (New York: Elsevier, 1973); and Jeffrey S. Milstein, Dynamics of the Vietnam
War: A Quantitative Analysis and Predictive Computer Simulation (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1974).
8. For the central thesis, see John Mueller, “Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and
Vietnam,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 (June 1971), pp. 358–375. For the full
compilation of polls, see John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley and
Sons, 1973).
9. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, p. 62.
Mueller later reinforced the “inexorable decline” view with his analysis of
public opinion during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which emphasized that pub-
lic support was far more precarious than the euphoria over the quick victory
might indicate.10 Other research also showed a direct link between mounting
casualties, antiwar protests, and subsequent changes in U.S. governmental
policy.11
This view of a ªxed pattern of declining public support with rising casual-
ties was challenged in a series of major scholarly investigations assessing pub-
lic opinion and national security during the Cold War. These studies painted a
picture of a “rational public,” one capable of responding to elite debates and
weighing the complexities of foreign policy.12 The public, in this way, went
through what Alvin Richman called a simple “ends-means” calculus.13 Ap-
plying this approach, Eric Larson found, contrary to Mueller, that a complex
cost-beneªt calculation ªts the data better than a reºexive, logarithmic re-
sponse.14 Today, the scholarly consensus is nearly unanimous in favor of the
“rational cost-beneªt” model, and Larson’s oft-cited version serves as a point
of departure for much subsequent research in the ªeld.
The cost-beneªt model, however, is not by itself a rebuttal of the casualty-
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10. John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
Scott Gartner and Gary Segura revised this argument somewhat, noting that support for the Ko-
rean and Vietnam Wars declined with logged casualties during periods when the casualty rates
were low; but in periods of high casualty rates, public support dropped with marginal casualties,
not logged cumulative casualties. See Gartner and Segura, “War Casualties and Public Opinion,”
Journal of Conºict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 278–320.
11. Mark Lorell and Charles Kelley, Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy during the Viet-
nam War, R-3060-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1985).
12. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown
of Consensus (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984); Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic
Governance of National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Eugene
Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1990); Ronald Hinckley, People, Polls, and Policy Makers (New York: Lexington,
1992); Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’
Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Paul Sniderman, “The New Look in
Public Opinion Research,” in Ada Finifter, ed., The State of the Discipline II (Washington, D.C.:
American Political Science Association, 1993); John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Public Opinion
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Alvin Richman, “When Should We Be Prepared to
Fight?” Public Perspective, Vol. 6, No. 3 (April/May 1995), p. 44; and Ole Holsti, Public Opinion and
American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). For a more skeptical
view, but not one that dismisses polling altogether, see Scott Althaus, Collective Preferences in Demo-
cratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and the Will of the People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003).
13. Richman, “When Should We Be Prepared to Fight?”
14. Eric Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S.
Military Operations (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996).
phobia thesis, and, indeed, the model has given rise to the second debate in the
academic literature: If the public applies something like an economic rational
calculation about war, how inelastic is the public’s “demand” for war?15 Thus,
in more recent work, Mueller explicitly accepts the cost-beneªt model, but,
writing before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, he argued that the
public saw so little beneªt in most military missions that in effect the cost-
beneªt calculation was functionally equivalent to a casualty-phobic posture.16
Likewise, Louis Klarevas endorses the cost-beneªt model, but then elsewhere
argues that for some key categories of missions, the public’s sensitivity to casu-
alties is so high that trivial numbers of casualties can produce a “Somalia syn-
drome.”17 Most scholars who have examined public opinion polls closely
come down on the other side, however, concluding that the demand, although
not completely inelastic, is nevertheless not as price sensitive as to approxi-
mate casualty phobia.18
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15. In fact, the positions of the various participants in this ªrst wave of debate are not as sharply
distinct as the literature implies. For example, John Mueller’s ªndings about the erosion of sup-
port for the Korean and Vietnam Wars could be consistent with a cost-beneªt calculation by mem-
bers of the public. Viewed in this way, the mounting casualty tolls in those wars meant that the
costs for securing the goals at stake were rising. If the value of the goals remains constant, then one
would expect rising costs to turn the net cost-beneªt calculation against supporting the mission.
16. Karl P. Mueller, “Politics, Death, and Morality in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Aerospace Power Journal,
Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 12–16.
17. This term derives from the precipitous drop in public support for the U.S. intervention in So-
malia after the killing of U.S. Rangers there in 1993. For slightly differing views of the “Somalia
syndrome,” compare Louis Klarevas, “The ‘Essential Domino’ of Military Operations: American
Public Opinion and the Use of Force,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 4 (November
2002), pp. 417–437, with Louis Klarevas, “Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia,”
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Winter 2000), pp. 523–540.
18. This is the conclusion of the following poll-based analyses: Bruce Jentleson, “The Pretty Pru-
dent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 49–74; Richman, “When Should We Be Prepared to
Fight?”; Steven Kull, “What the Public Knows That Washington Doesn’t,” Foreign Policy, No. 102
(Winter 1995/96), pp. 102–116; Larson, Casualties and Consensus; Warren Strobel, Late-Breaking For-
eign Policy: The News Media’s Inºuence on Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: United States Insti-
tute of Peace, 1997); Rebecca L. Britton and Bruce Jentleson, “Still Pretty Prudent,” Journal of
Conºict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 4 (August 1998), pp. 395–418; James Burk, “Public Support for
Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis,” Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 53–78; Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, Misreading the Pub-
lic: The Myth of a New Isolationism (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999); Peter Feaver and Christo-
pher Gelpi, “How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer,” Washington Post,
November 7, 1999; Philip Everts, “When the Going Gets Rough: Does the Public Support the Use
of Force?” World Affairs, Vol. 162, No. 3 (Winter 2000), pp. 91–107; Philip Everts, “War without
Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conºict over Kosovo,” in Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, eds.,
Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (New York: Routledge, 2001); Andrew Erdmann,
“The U.S. Presumption of Quick, Costless Wars,” Orbis, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 363–382;
Philip Everts, Democracy and Military Force (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing
The third debate takes the issue of elasticity a step further: What factors
shape the elasticity of demand for military missions? Put another way, under
what conditions will the number of casualties cause public support for a given
mission to decline more rapidly or more slowly? There is a wide scholarly con-
sensus that multiple factors may be at work at the same time.19 What distin-
guishes different scholars in this third wave of debate, however, is the pride of
place they give to certain factors.20
First, Bruce Jentleson argues that the “pretty prudent” public bases its casu-
alty tolerance on “the principal policy objective (PPO)” envisioned by the mili-
tary operation.21 He contends that the public will accept missions with PPOs
focused on what he calls “foreign policy restraint” (FPR) goals as important
missions that are worth a substantial cost. Foreign policy restraint missions in-
clude the traditional military tasks of using force to coerce an adversary en-
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Your Battles; and Richard C. Eichenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the
Use of Military Force, 1981–2005,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 140–177.
19. Eric Larson, “Putting Theory to Work: Diagnosing Public Opinion on the U.S. Intervention in
Bosnia,” in Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold, eds., Being Useful: Policy Relevance and Interna-
tional Relations Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 174–236; and Klarevas,
“The ‘Essential Domino’ of Military Operations.”
20. Here we list only the factors that might vary from case to case in the current era. A number of
other arguments emphasize different factors that would explain changes in the underlying casu-
alty tolerance from what it might have been in previous generations. Thus, Edward Luttwak ar-
gues that the U.S. public is more casualty sensitive now than in the time of World Wars I and II
because of the lower birth rate. See Edward Luttwak, “Towards Post-heroic Warfare,” Foreign Af-
fairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May–June 1995), pp. 109–122; and Edward Luttwak, “A Post-heroic Military
Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July–August 1996), pp. 33–44. Charles Moskos argues that
the public is more casualty sensitive now because they see that children of the elite are not at risk
in most military missions. See Moskos, “Grave Decision: When Americans Accept Casualties,”
Chicago Tribune, December 12, 1995. Harvey Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro argue that casualty pho-
bia has driven changes in technology, which have, in turn, reinforced casualty phobia by fostering
unrealistic expectations of the likely low human toll of war. See Sapolsky and Shapiro, “Casualties,
Technology, and America’s Future Wars,” Parameters, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 119–127.
Numerous observers have argued that the advent of near-real-time television coverage of military
operations has heightened public casualty sensitivity by giving the deaths a vividness and imme-
diacy that make them more shocking. See, for example, Frank Stech, “Winning CNN Wars,” Pa-
rameters, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 37–56; Johanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War: Is Media
Technology Driving International Politics? (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996); and Steven Livingston,
“Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Inter-
vention,” research paper R-18 (Cambridge, Mass.: Joan Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics, and
Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1997). Logically, these
works belong in the ªrst or second wave because they claim that the public is, in fact, highly casu-
alty sensitive and blame a factor that is largely unavoidable and so should apply with equal force
to every military mission the United States might consider. These issues are explored in greater de-
tail in Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reiºer, “Paying the Human Costs of War,” Duke
University, 2005.
21. Jentleson “The Pretty Prudent Public”; and Jentleson and Britton “Still Pretty Prudent.”
gaged in aggressive action against the United States or its allies. On the other
hand, Jentleson argues that “humanitarian intervention” missions will enjoy
public support only if the costs are relatively low. Finally, he expects that mis-
sions focused on “internal political change” will contend with even more frag-
ile levels of public support.
Second, Eric Larson argues that public casualty tolerance follows domestic
elite casualty tolerance.22 When domestic elites line up in a consensus behind
the mission, public support will be robust even in the face of mounting costs,
but when domestic elites are divided, even a small number of casualties will
quickly diminish public support.
Third, Steven Kull argues that public support for a military mission will be
more robust if the public sees that other countries likewise support the mis-
sion, and thus the United States is not obliged to bear all of the costs.23 Multi-
lateral support may function as an elite cue—”this mission must be worth the
cost because lots of other states are supporting it” 24—or the public may simply
prefer to have the burden distributed more evenly.
Finally, Feaver and Gelpi identify expectations of success as the crucial fac-
tor in explaining the public’s tolerance of casualties.25 When the public be-
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22. Larson, Casualties and Consensus, applies John Zaller’s model of how elites cue public opinion.
See Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Public Opinion. Larson, “Putting Theory to Work,” offers a
model for weighing multiple factors simultaneously, including various indices that attempt to
measure the public’s perceived utility in a given military mission, expectations of success, and
leadership cuing. He gives pride of place, however, to leadership cuing.
23. Steven Kull, I.M. Destler, and Clay Ramsay, The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread
the Public (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997); Kull and Destler
Misreading the Public; Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, “A Rejoinder from Kull and Ramsay,” Interna-
tional Studies Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 2 (August 2000), pp. 202–205; and Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay,
Stefan Subias, Phillip Warf, and Monica Wolford, “Americans on the Conºict with Iraq,” PIPA/
Knowledge Networks poll, October 2, 2002.
24. Joseph Grieco hypothesizes this as the critical factor behind a public preference for
multilateralism in Grieco, “Let’s Get a Second Opinion: Allies, the U.N., and U.S. Public Support
for War,” Duke University, 2003.
25. Feaver and Gelpi, “How Many Deaths Are Acceptable?”; Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Bat-
tles; and Peter Feaver, “To Maintain That Support, Show Us What Success Means,” Washington
Post, October 7, 2001. Kull and Ramsay reach a similar conclusion: “Americans do not and are not
likely to respond reºexively to losses by wanting to withdraw from a military operation . . . pro-
vided that the public has support for the operation in the ªrst place and believes that it is likely to
succeed.” See Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, “The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Atti-
tudes on Military Fatalities in the Post–Cold War Period,” in Everts and Isernia, Public Opinion and
the International Use of Force, pp. 205–228. In their analysis of Dutch public opinion surrounding the
Bosnian operation, Jan van der Meulen and Marijke de Konink concluded that expectations of suc-
cess were the best predictor of Dutch casualty tolerance. See van der Meulen and de Konink,
“Risky Missions: Dutch Public Opinion on Peacekeeping in the Balkans,” in Everts and Isernia,
Public Opinion and the International Use of Force, pp. 116–138. See also Steven Kull “Review of Eric
lieves that the mission will succeed, it continues to support the mission, even
as costs mount. When the public thinks victory is unlikely, even small costs
will cause support to plummet. Note that the critical belief speciªed here is the
expectation of eventual future success, not necessarily assessments of how the
war is going right now or most recently.26 In a comprehensive analysis of ag-
gregate public opinion trends from 1981 through 2004, Richard Eichenberg
reached a similar conclusion: “Successful military operations enjoy high sup-
port even when the objective is unpopular and casualties are suffered.”27
Each of these studies establishes convincingly that the favored factor mat-
ters (and most also show that other factors matter, too). But little progress has
been made in assessing the relative importance of these factors. In the sections
that follow, we evaluate these and other arguments through a reanalysis of
publicly available polls and a detailed analysis of a series of proprietary polls
we designed explicitly to tap into public attitudes on casualties.28 This method
allows us to combine various forms of data suited for different types of infer-
ences. First, to assess the ªrst two waves of the casualty tolerance debate re-
garding the inexorable decline of support in response to casualties, we
examine the aggregate level of presidential approval and how it responds to
U.S. military deaths in Iraq from January 2003 through the presidential elec-
tion in November 2004. Next, to assess the third wave of debate on the sources
of variation in casualty tolerance, we analyze individual-level data on toler-
ance for casualties in Iraq. This represents important progress in the study of
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Larson’s Casualties and Consensus,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 672–
674.
26. In this way, the category “expectations of success” differs from the variable highlighted by
Gartner and Segura—marginal casualty rates. In their words, “Recent casualties send a signal that
the war is not going well—a signal that dominates other cost measures when the marginal casu-
alty level is increasing.” Gartner and Segura, “War Casualties and Public Opinion,” p. 295.
27. Eichenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends,” p. 147.
28. The proprietary polls include a telephone survey of a random digit dial (RDD) national sam-
ple of 1,203 adults conducted by the Parker Group from September 22 to October 12, 2003, and
seven additional surveys of national representative samples (using a different and shorter instru-
ment) administered via the internet by Knowledge Networks: Wave 1 (February 6–20, 2004, 891
respondents), Wave 2 (February 25–March 4, 870 respondents), Wave 3 (March 5–18, 930 respon-
dents), Wave 4 (March 19–April 2, 889 respondents), Wave 5 (April 2–16, 881 respondents), Wave 6
(April 17–29, 899 respondents), and Wave 7 (June 18–28, 900 respondents). Finally, we conducted a
more extensive survey through Knowledge Networks in the weeks leading up to the 2004 presi-
dential election: Wave 8 (October 15–November 1, 1,125 respondents). The Knowledge Networks
data are equivalent to the national RDD sample because they draw samples from a large panel of
respondents that is a national probability sample. For more information on the Knowledge Net-
works methodology, see http://www.knowledgenetworks.com. The full survey instruments are
available from the authors.
casualty tolerance because so much of the previous work in this area has been
hampered by an exclusive reliance on aggregate data.
Aggregate Presidential Approval: U.S. Casualties and the War
in Iraq
We collected weekly data on U.S. combat deaths from January 1, 2003, through
November 1, 2004.29 For the same period, we collected opinion data on three
crucial issues: approval of the president in general, approval of the president’s
handling of the situation in Iraq, and whether the Iraq war has been “worth
it.”30 Presidential approval is asked frequently with standardized language,
yielding a consistent measure of this attitude. The Iraq approval and “worth
it” questions are asked less frequently, and their wording varies. For space rea-
sons, we present only our analyses using presidential approval as the depend-
ent variable. Attitudes toward these issues are strongly correlated with overall
approval, and so the results do not change when using the other dependent
variables.31
Figure 1 displays average weekly approval ratings for President Bush from
March 2003—immediately prior to the outbreak of war—until November 2004.
The data indicate a substantial increase in approval that President Bush re-
ceived after launching the war in Iraq. This bounce is consistent with the
extensive literature on the “rally ‘round the ºag” effect.32 We divide our aggre-
gation of the number of U.S. military deaths in Iraq into three time periods.
The squares show U.S. fatalities during the “major combat” phase of the war,
which covers the initial invasion of Iraq, the toppling of the Baath regime, and
the movement of coalition forces into a position of occupation in Iraq. The cir-
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29. The data were drawn from the following ofªcial military news sources: the Army Times, Navy
Times, Air Force Times, and Marine Times. All are available at http://www.militarycity.com/valor/
honor.html.
30. For these data, see http://www.pollingreport.com. We included only polls with identical
wording of the presidential approval question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George
W. Bush is handling his job as president?” Thus polls such as the Zogby poll that introduce the cat-
egory of “mixed feelings” toward the president were not included in our measure of presidential
approval. For weeks in which there were multiple national polls, we took the average of these
presidential approval ratings. We interpolated the one missing data point to obtain a continuous
ninety-seven-observation, weekly time-series.
31. The correlation between overall presidential approval and approval of the president’s han-
dling of Iraq was 0.95. The correlation of both of those variables with aggregate opinion of
whether the war in Iraq has been “worth it” is 0.90.
32. Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
cles represent military deaths that occurred after the media began to report a
coordinated resistance against the U.S.-led occupation in May 2003, but before
the coalition transferred sovereignty to an Iraqi authority in June 2004. We re-
fer to this as the “occupation” period. Finally, the triangles represent U.S. mili-
tary deaths that occurred between the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi
authority and the presidential election. We refer to this as the “sovereign Iraq”
period of the war.33
Figure 1 indicates that U.S. military deaths did not appear to have the same
impact on presidential approval in the “major combat,” “occupation,” and
“sovereign Iraq” phases of the war. For example, presidential approval actu-
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33. Media reports for this coding were drawn from the Tyndall Report, which records the amount
of time that network news broadcasts spend on various issues each week. Based on the Tyndall
Report, we identiªed the “occupation” period as beginning in late May 2003. The “Iraq sovereign
period” began with the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004. For these data, see http://www
.tyndallreport.com.
Figure 1. Presidential Approval and Casualties from the War in Iraq
ally increased despite the toll of U.S. casualties during the major combat phase
of the war. This is not to say that the public increased its approval of the presi-
dent because U.S. soldiers were being killed. Rather, the public rallied to sup-
port the president despite the casualties because it was conªdent that the
United States would succeed. After the onset of the insurgency, however, pres-
idential approval dropped steadily as the death toll increased. After the U.S.
transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, on the other hand, U.S. casualties continued to
mount at the same rate as during the occupation, but presidential approval os-
cillated at about 50 percent despite the mounting death toll.
Thus, at ªrst glance, the data in Figure 1 seem to call into question the notion
that casualties have a consistent or inexorable effect on presidential approval.
Even if one dismisses the shift from major combat to occupation as the fading
of a “rally ‘round the ºag,” the second shift after the transfer of sovereignty re-
mains a puzzle. Table 1 provides a more systematic analysis of the relationship
between U.S. military deaths in Iraq and presidential approval. In addition to
the number of deaths, we accounted for the impact of growth in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA),34 and we also included measures of the volume of
media coverage, as measured by the content of the weeknight broadcasts of
ABC, CBS, and NBC News.35 We divided media coverage into four periods:
prewar, major combat, occupation, and sovereign Iraq. The prewar media cov-
erage variable counts the number of minutes that the crisis with Iraq was cov-
ered; during the major combat, occupation, and sovereign Iraq phases of the
war, we recorded the number of minutes per week that the network news
broadcasts covered combat between the U.S. military and Iraqi or insurgent
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34. Because our dependent variable is overall presidential approval, we control for the public per-
ceptions of the overall performance of the U.S. economy. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
represents an excellent summary measure of public perceptions of the economy for two central
reasons. First, ºuctuations in prices across a broad index such as the DJIA reºect changes across a
number of economic indicators; traders incorporate a wide range of information about economic
performance into the trades that generate shifts in the DJIA. The DJIA thus serves as something of
a composite index of economic factors of political interest. Second, although the members of the
public are probably not aware of much of the information that goes into these trades, many of
them will be aware of changes in the DJIA because these are so widely published in newspapers
and reported on daily radio and television news broadcasts. Finally, our time-series of presidential
approval is composed of weekly aggregations, while most aggregate economic indicators are
available only on a monthly or quarterly basis. The DJIA, however, is easily aggregated on a
weekly basis and is often reported to the public as weekly changes. Growth was measured as the
weekly opening price of the DJIA subtracted from the weekly closing price and divided by the
opening price.
35. This measure records only the volume of coverage. It makes no attempt to capture any posi-
tive or negative content of the stories. Minutes were aggregated on a weekly basis, and data were
drawn from the Tyndall Report.
forces. Finally, we included dummy variables to mark several important
events in the ºow of the war in Iraq. In addition to dummy variables for the
onset of the combat, occupation, and Iraqi sovereignty periods, we provided a
dummy variable for the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, which
had a signiªcant—though brief—positive impact on the public’s perception of
the success of U.S. operations. We also include a dummy variable for the re-
lease of the Kay report in January 2004, which indicates that Iraq may not have
possessed stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction as the Bush administra-
tion had contended.36 All independent variables were lagged one week.37
Model 1 in Table 1 examines Mueller’s hypothesis that public support for a
war will erode with the log of military deaths. Contrary to Mueller’s ªnding
on the Korea and Vietnam cases, the log of casualties does not ªt the Iraqi war
data and, in fact, the overall ªt of this model is poor. None of the variables as-
sociated with the war are statistically signiªcant. The only statistically sig-
niªcant effect is the volume of media coverage of Democratic presidential
candidates. The coefªcient for the log of casualties is minuscule and does not
approach signiªcance, indicating that casualties—on average—had no impact
at all on presidential approval from March 2003 through November 2004.
In model 2, however, we allow for the possibility that U.S. military casual-
ties may have had very different effects on presidential approval during the
major combat, occupation, and sovereign Iraq phases of the war because of the
substantial differences in public expectations of U.S. success. The overall ªt of
the model is dramatically improved. Whereas model 1 yielded an R-squared of
0.53, making the impact of casualties contingent on the phase of the war in-
creases the R-squared to 0.83. Because of the interaction between casualties
and approval in model 2, calculating the overall effect of casualties for each
phase of the war—and the proper standard errors for hypothesis testing—is
more complex. Thus we calculate the overall impact of casualties on presiden-
tial approval for each of the three phases of the Iraq war in Table 2. The shift
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36. These dummy variables set a new intercept value for the presidential approval time-series af-
ter each event occurs. The dummy variables are coded 0 prior to the occurrence of the event and 1
afterward. Controlling for the initiation of the war as a “rally event” had no impact on the coef-
ªcients in Table 1, and the variable was not statistically signiªcant. This is probably because the ca-
sualties suffered during the major combat phase capture the rally effect.
37. A Phillips-Perron unit root test indicated that the presidential approval time-series is trend sta-
tionary (p  0.05). The coefªcients in Table 1 use the Prais-Winsten correction for serial correlation
in a time-series. The estimated rho for models 1 and 2 were 0.82 and 0.27, respectively. The initial
Durbin-Watson statistics were 1.18 and 1.61, indicating a statistically signiªcant autocorrelation
problem for both models. The transformed Durbin-Watson statistics were 2.35 and 2.03, indicating
that the Prais-Winsten correction addressed the problem.
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Log of total casualties 0.101 2.255
(0.12) (4.21)**
Casualties x U.S. occupation 11.642
(6.29)**
Casualties x Iraq sovereign 2.363
(0.28)
U.S. occupation 1.634 55.157
(0.60) (5.41)**
Iraq sovereign again 3.340 3.377
(0.78) (0.06)
After Saddam Hussein captured 2.625 3.850
(1.08) (2.30)*
After release of the Kay report 1.047 3.034
(0.43) (2.03)*
Prewar media coverage of Iraq 0.042 0.061
(1.28) (2.19)*
Media coverage of major combat 0.026 0.030
(1.93) (3.49)**
Media coverage of insurgency 0.017 0.008
(1.58) (0.80)
Media coverage of sovereign Iraq 0.021 0.008
(0.91) (0.37)
Media coverage of Democrats 0.032 0.036
(2.28)* (2.61)*






NOTE: Absolute value of t statistics appears in parentheses.
*significant at 5 percent; **significant at 1 percent
from major combat to the insurgency against the U.S. occupation had a nega-
tive effect on the relationship between casualties and presidential approval.
Speciªcally, the coefªcient shifts from 2.26 to 9.34. Both of these effects are
statistically signiªcant. Notice, however, that after the United States trans-
ferred sovereignty to an Iraqi authority, the impact of casualties shifts again.
Consistent with our impressionistic evaluation of Figure 1, the model indicates
that, between June and November 2004, casualties had no impact on presiden-
tial approval. The coefªcient is reduced to 0.108, and the effect does not ap-
proach statistical signiªcance. Such attenuation in the impact of casualties is
particularly striking in light of the tremendous media coverage given to the
death toll as the number of U.S. troops killed in action approached 1,000.
The shift between the occupation and sovereign Iraq phases of the war indi-
cates that the relationship between casualties and presidential approval is not
constant. The data cannot be explained as a brief rally effect followed by a
steady decline in approval in response to mounting casualties. This result does
not imply that the public did not care about U.S. casualties after the transfer of
sovereignty, but it does suggest that its tolerance for casualties increased be-
tween June and November 2004.
Accounting for the varying impact of casualties improves the ªt of the
model so much that it allows us to detect the impact of other variables as well.
As Table 1 shows, we can see that the volume of media coverage can have
varying inºuences on presidential approval. For example, media coverage of
Iraq evoked a rally effect prior to the outbreak of the war and during the major
combat phase; but coverage of combat since the onset of the insurgency has
had no impact. Not surprisingly, media coverage of Democratic presidential
candidates reduced presidential approval. Other events on the ground in Iraq
inºuenced approval as well. For example, the capture of Saddam Hussein in
December 2003 boosted approval by nearly 4 percentage points, while the re-
lease of the Kay report shrank approval by 3 points. Moreover, the DJIA does
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Table 2. The Contingent Impact of Casualties on Presidential Approval during the
Iraq War, March 2003–November 2004
Phase of Iraq War
Coefficient for
Impact of Casualties Standard Error
Level of Statistical
Significance
Major combat 2.26 0.536  0.001
U.S. occupation 9.34 1.77  0.001
Iraqi sovereignty 0.108 8.48  0.990
have a statistically signiªcant and substantively important impact on presi-
dential approval.
Our data on casualties and presidential approval closely correspond with
those of Eichenberg and Richard Stoll, who analyzed similar data with a
slightly different statistical model and concluded that with every additional
100 casualties and controlling for the rally effect, approval of the president’s
handling of Iraq dropped 3 percentage points, and approval of the president
overall dropped by about 1 percentage point.38 We depart from Eichenberg
and Stoll’s interpretation by distinguishing between the differing effects of ca-
sualties during the major combat, occupation, and sovereign Iraq phases of the
war. This pattern of varying levels of public casualty sensitivity also ªts the re-
sults Feaver and Gelpi found when examining other conºicts, including
reanalyzing Mueller’s data on public opinion during the Korean and Vietnam
Wars.39 When the public appears to be conªdent of a U.S. victory, casualties
have little effect on popular support. But if the public’s conªdence is shaken,
then casualties erode support. When this occurs, the relationship appears to be
logarithmic. That is, small numbers of casualties will matter early on in a
conºict, but as the combat deaths escalate, it takes increasingly large incre-
ments of military deaths to reduce support. This relationship, however, is con-
ditional on low expectations of success.
Anecdotal evidence from available polls suggests that these shifts in casu-
alty tolerance relate to the U.S. public’s expectations of success. During the ma-
jor combat phase, the public was conªdent, and rightly so, that the United
States could invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power. As early as
March 27, 2003—prior to the fall of Baghdad in April—a Time/CNN poll re-
ported that 52 percent of the public was already willing to label the war a suc-
cess.40 But the onset of the insurgency against the occupation in May shook the
public’s conªdence in a successful outcome. In mid-July another Time/CNN
poll asked the same question and found that only 39 percent of respondents
felt that the U.S. effort was a success—even though the United States had top-
pled Hussein and occupied Iraq.41 By November 2003 only 25 percent of the
public stated that the war had been successful.42 The granting of sovereignty
Success Matters 23
38. Richard C. Eichenberg and Richard J. Stoll, “The Political Fortunes of War: Iraq and the Do-
mestic Standing of President George W. Bush” (London: Foreign Policy Centre, July 2004).
39. Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles, pp. 132–144.
40. Time/CNN/Harris poll, March 27, 2003.
41. Time/CNN/Harris poll, July 16, 2003.
42. Time/CNN/Harris poll, November 18, 2003.
and creation of an Iraqi government also seem to have reºected a similar—
though less dramatic—shift in public optimism. By May of 2004 public
conªdence reached its nadir with only 37 percent of respondents stating that
the war was going “very well” or “somewhat well.” But by the eve of the pres-
idential election in October 2004, that number had risen to 57 percent.43
The attitude tapped by these Time/CNN polls, however, differs from the
“expectations of success” concept emphasized here. These polls asked respon-
dents to make a judgment about accomplished fact—was the war a success
now—rather than a judgment about the likelihood of the future event—will
the war eventually be successful? Our thesis is that expectations of future suc-
cess are the key determinants of public casualty tolerance. That is, the U.S.
public can accept that the war is not yet won and will involve continued and
even mounting costs, provided that events thus far are not convincing it that
eventual success is impossible. But other factors may also have been shifting
when the Time/CNN polls were taken. More generally, we cannot base infer-
ences about individual attitudes solely on shifts in aggregate opinion. In fact,
one of the principal weaknesses of the current analyses of public opinion and
casualty tolerance is the almost exclusive reliance on aggregate data. Thus
Mueller, Jentleson, Larson, and often Feaver and Gelpi are left in the difªcult
position of observing shifts in aggregate support for military operations in
published polls and then inferring the cause of ºuctuations in support from
external events.44 Such inferences are made even more problematic by the ob-
vious ecological inference problem involved in reaching such conclusions. To
achieve ªrm conclusions about the process by which individual members of
the public form attitudes about tolerating the costs of war, we must collect and
analyze data on individuals’ opinions.
Sources of Individual Variation in Casualty Tolerance
Beginning in October 2003 and extending through October 2004, we conducted
a series of surveys of public attitudes toward the Bush administration’s deci-
sions to use force and toward the current war in Iraq in particular. Our survey
tapped respondents’ views about the primary policy objective, the extent of
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43. CBS News poll, May 23, 2004. October data are from October 15 through November 1, 2004.
Our question labels the second category “fairly well” instead of “somewhat well.”
44. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion; Jentleson, The Pretty Prudent Public; Britton and
Jentleson, “Still Pretty Prudent,” p. 395; Larson, Casualties and Consensus; and Feaver and Gelpi,
Choosing Your Battles.
elite consensus, and their conªdence in victory. Following on work by
Jentleson, Larson, and Kull, among others, we suggest that overall the U.S.
public follows a prudent and reasonable path in deciding whether it will toler-
ate U.S. casualties in a military operation.45 Our principal difference with
Jentleson, Larson, and Kull is not over the prudence of the U.S. public, but
over the relative importance of various factors in their calculations.
We argue that survey respondents’ tolerance for casualties in the war in Iraq
is a function of two central explanatory variables: (1) the extent to which they
believe that President Bush did the right thing in attacking Iraq, and (2) the ex-
tent to which they believe that the United States will emerge victorious. Those
who feel strongly that the president “did the right thing” in attacking are ex-
pressing a belief that the Bush administration had good cause for using mili-
tary force in this case.46 Respondents could have many reasons for stating that
the president did the right thing by using military force—including the desire
to enforce UN resolutions, the desire to keep the United States secure from sus-
pected Iraqi WMD, the desire to prevent Iraq from sharing suspected WMD
with terrorists, the desire to promote human rights and punish a vicious dicta-
tor, or the desire to instill democratic governance in the Middle East. Whatever
policy goals individuals may emphasize in their thinking about why the presi-
dent did the right thing, we are arguing that it is something for which they
would be willing to pay a cost if the goal were achieved.
The second variable captures a respondent’s judgment about the likelihood
that the United States will be able to achieve whatever goals he or she believes
are at stake in Iraq. Our measure attempts to separate beliefs about likely vic-
tory from any expectations of beneªts. Speciªcally, we asked respondents:
“Regardless of whether you think that the president did the right thing, would
you say that the U.S. is very likely to succeed in Iraq, somewhat likely to suc-
ceed, not very likely to succeed, or not at all likely to succeed?” We did not
specify for respondents what success might mean; as we discuss below, we
probed that question in follow-on surveys.
These two attitudes can combine in four basic ways. Respondents in the ªrst
category, which in this case might be considered the “Bush base,” believe that
the war was right and that the United States will win. Those in the opposing
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45. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public”; Larson, Casualties and Consensus; and Larson, “Putting
Theory to Work.”
46. We asked respondents, “I would like to know whether you think President Bush did the right
thing by using military force against Iraq. Would you say that you strongly approve, somewhat
approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove of his decision?”
category, which we call “the Vietnam syndrome,” believe that the war was
wrong and the United States will lose. Obviously, we would expect the former
group to have much greater casualty tolerance than the latter group. But re-
spondents with intermediate attitudes—the “noble failure” view that the war
was right, but the United States will lose, and the “Pottery Barn we broke it,
we’ll ªx it” view that war was wrong, but the United States will win—pose
more interesting theoretical questions that allow us to compare the relative im-
portance of the two attitudes in shaping casualty tolerance.
We contend that expectations of success will matter more, and thus the “Pot-
tery Barn” respondent will express a greater tolerance than the “noble failure”
respondent for the human costs of the war. Even if one believes that the United
States was unjustiªed in attacking Iraq, failure could damage its reputation or
leave Iraq even more vulnerable to the inªltration of terrorist groups—all
would mean that U.S. lives were lost in vain. Indeed, some could argue that
once a conºict has begun, the United States has an intrinsic national interest in
winning regardless of the original rationale.
To compare our argument about the interactive impact of “rightness” and
expected success to other prominent arguments about the sources of casualty
tolerance, we also included control variables to capture the effects hypothe-
sized by Jentleson, Larson, and Kull. As we noted above, Jentleson argues that
casualty tolerance will be higher when the public believes that the primary
policy objective of the mission involves the defense of the United States or its
allies against outside attack. With regard to the debate surrounding the war in
Iraq, this attitude was most centrally focused on the question of whether the
war in Iraq should be considered a part of the Bush administration’s “war on
terrorism.” In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the war on terrorism was
widely perceived as addressing a threat to the U.S. homeland. The Bush ad-
ministration argued that Iraq posed a similar threat, by virtue of the possible
nexus between alleged Iraqi pursuit of WMD and alleged Iraqi links to terror-
ists who might use them. Even the administration’s third pillar—namely, the
humanitarian argument about ridding the region of Hussein’s oppressive rule
and thereby creating the conditions for democracy to take hold in the Middle
East—had a link to the broader war on terror, because the administration
maintained that the spread of democratic freedoms was the most effective
long-term solution to addressing the root causes of terrorism. If the survey re-
spondents did not perceive any link between Iraq and the broader war on ter-
ror, the case for war rested on a strictly humanitarian argument (or perhaps a
legalistic one about enforcing UN resolutions). Thus in Jentleson’s terms, the
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central factor determining respondents’ casualty sensitivity should be the ex-
tent to which they believe that the Iraq war is linked to the war on terrorism.47
Larson’s model of the public’s cost-beneªt evaluation of war includes a
wide range of variables, but he gives pride of place to public perceptions of an
elite consensus in support of the mission. According to this view, the public
takes cues from the political elite in deciding whether to support a military op-
eration. To the extent that elites from across the political spectrum support an
operation, members of the public will also be supportive. Measuring the extent
of elite consensus presents difªcult problems, complicating analyses of the ag-
gregate relationship between consensus and public support. Because we are
analyzing individual-level attitudes, however, the key variable for Larson
should be the extent to which a respondent perceives an elite consensus in
support of the war. Thus we asked respondents whether they believed that Re-
publican and Democratic leaders agree that the United States should remain in
Iraq until the Iraqi government is stable and secure.48
Finally, Kull’s recent work has emphasized public attitudes toward multilat-
eralism as critical in determining public tolerance of casualties. Numerous
polls indicate that the American public looks favorably on gaining allied sup-
port for U.S. military operations and on obtaining UN Security Council au-
thority for using force. This minimal level of multilateralism, however, does
not adequately measure the impact that multilateralism should have on casu-
alty tolerance and the war in Iraq. After all, even many policymakers who are
widely viewed as unilateralist would agree that ceteris paribus it is better to
have multilateral international support. The critical question is: What should
the United States do if it is unable to obtain international legitimization for a
particular mission? With regard to UN authorization, for example, should the
president proceed with a mission alone if he deems it necessary and cannot
persuade the United Nations to sanction force? Or should he postpone the
mission until he is able to obtain support from the Security Council? To the ex-
tent that multilateralism has a substantive constraining effect on U.S. policy,
we contend that it implies the latter attitude. Thus Kull’s argument about the
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47. We asked the question, “Which of the following best describes your beliefs about the war in
Iraq and the war on terrorism?” Respondents were given four possible response categories: (1)
Iraq is the “central front” in the war on terror; (2) the war in Iraq is “an important part of the war
on terrorism, but it is not the central battle”; (3) Iraq is “not a part of the war on terrorism”; and (4)
the war in Iraq is “a distraction from the war on terrorism.”
48. The question was posed as follows: “Do you think America’s political leaders—both Republi-
can and Democrat—agree that the U.S. troops should remain in Iraq until the new Iraqi govern-
ment is stable and secure?” Respondents could answer yes or no.
impact of multilateralism on public support implies that respondents who
hold the latter belief should be substantially less willing to tolerate casualties
in Iraq, because the president chose to launch the attack without explicit UN
approval.49
measuring casualty tolerance
Our dependent variable is the survey respondents’ willingness to continue to
support military operations in Iraq as the human cost continues to mount. Spe-
ciªcally, we asked: “Regardless of whether you think the president made the
right decision in attacking Iraq, as you know the United States is engaged in an
ongoing military operation there and has suffered about ____ military deaths
in combat.50 Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a
new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in no additional U.S. military
deaths?” If a respondent answered afªrmatively, we asked the question again,
this time raising the number of deaths. Those who answered negatively
moved on to the next question. In the October 2003 survey, respondents had a
chance to answer if they would support the war if there were up to 500 deaths,
then to 5,000, and ªnally to 50,000, jumping to the next level if the respondent
stated that he or she would continue to support the operation. The lowest ca-
sualty threshold—500 deaths—was updated in subsequent surveys as the
number of U.S. combat deaths increased.51 We continued to ask about toler-
ance for about 200–400 or more than the number the United States suffered at
the time of the survey. Since the rate of U.S. military deaths has remained con-
sistent since the end of major combat operations, our question essentially
asked respondents if they were willing to continue supporting the war in Iraq
for at least the next three to six months.52
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49. We asked, “Before deciding to take military action, the president often seeks the approval of
international organizations like the United Nations. What should the president do if he is not able
to gain that approval? The response options were (1) “he should not take military action period,
regardless of whether he can get international approval”; (2) “he should delay military action until
he receives international approval”; (3) “he should take military action even without international
approval if he thinks it is necessary”; and (4) “he should not seek international approval before de-
ciding to take military action.”
50. We inserted the appropriate death toll at the beginning of each wave.
51. Any potential bias from changes in question wording would tend to exaggerate the apparent
casualty sensitivity in the new surveys. As we are arguing that the public is more casualty tolerant
than commonly believed, this poses no problems for our analysis.
52. We believe that this measure of casualty tolerance can better gauge the policy-relevant issue of
continued support of an ongoing military operation than other more commonly used measures of
casualty sensitivity. For example, analysts often evaluate responses to questions about whether the
war in Iraq has been “worth it” as measures of casualty tolerance. But after asking whether the
This series of questions produced a ªve-category ordinal variable. The ªrst
category represents those who said they would not support the war even if
there were no more U.S. military deaths; one might think of this as a “stop
now” sort of response. The second category represents those who stated that
they would support the war if no more U.S. soldiers were killed, but would
not support the war if there were a total of 500 U.S. military deaths. We label
these respondents as “casualty phobic” because they are willing to support the
operation, but only if the human costs are minimally higher than they were at
that point (around 300 combat deaths). As noted above, the third category of
respondents essentially offers policymakers a window of opportunity to pros-
ecute the war. They stated they would support the war despite an additional
200 to 300 deaths, but would not support the war if 5,000 U.S. soldiers were
killed. The remaining categories of respondents were varying levels of “Iraq
hawks,” promising continued support of the war even if casualties mounted to
levels far in excess of anything military experts expected given the situation in
October 2003. The fourth category promised continued support if 5,000 U.S.
soldiers were killed but would withdraw support if the United States suffered
50,000 military deaths. The ªfth category of respondents stated that they
would support the war even if the United States suffered 50,000 deaths.
We followed up the October 2003 poll with a series of short polls from
February through June 2004, asking a similar casualty question updated to
reºect the new casualty tally. In surveys from February through April, we set
the window of opportunity threshold for casualty tolerance at 1,000 U.S. mili-
tary deaths. In June 2004, we increased the window of opportunity to 1,500 be-
cause of the rising U.S. death toll. Finally, in the last two weeks of October
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Iraq war has been “worth it,” we probed respondents about why the war was or was not “worth
it.” Approximately 45 percent of respondents who felt that the Iraq war was not “worth it” indi-
cated that they felt this way because “the U.S. should not have gone to war over this issue in the
ªrst place.” Fewer than one-third of those who responded that the war was not “worth it” stated
that the most important reason for their response was the number of U.S. soldiers killed. More-
over, in October 2004 more than 25 percent of the respondents who stated that the Iraq war had
not been “worth it” still stated that they would support the war if there were as many as 1,500 U.S.
combat deaths. Thus “worth it” questions appear to tap some mixture of respondents’ views about
casualty tolerance, their evaluation of the reasons for ªghting, and their assessment of the pros-
pects of success, making those data less useful for examining relationships among those various
attitudes. Our measure more effectively isolates attitudes about the willingness to bear the costs in
lives lost and frames the question in a way most relevant to policymakers: Will the respondent be
willing to continue to support an ongoing military operation in the face of rising costs? This dis-
tinction may explain why public opposition to the war—measured in terms of electoral conse-
quences for the president or the extent of public demonstration and outcry—has not grown as
swiftly as the number of respondents saying the war has not been “worth it.”
2004, we conducted a larger survey in the context of the November presiden-
tial election. In this survey, the window of opportunity was also set at 1,500.
For this larger survey, we also gathered data on respondents’ attitudes toward
the primary policy objective of the Iraq war, perceived elite consensus, and
their views on the importance of multilateralism in the U.S. decision to use
force.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the questions used to construct
our ordinal dependent variable. These are separate samples, not panel data,
limiting our ability to draw inferences about changes over time. The results
suggest four important points, however. First, our survey question appears to
be tapping into real attitudes because the numbers are stable yet move in sen-
sible ways; as the casualty toll mounts, the proportions in the various groups
shift accordingly, except for the “Iraq hawks” whose professed casualty toler-
ance vastly exceeds the actual mounting death toll.
Second, like most questions about tolerance for casualties, the questions in
our surveys tend to exaggerate public casualty sensitivity.53 Although rising
casualties did shift the aggregate response to our casualty tolerance question,
they did not do so by as much as the earlier survey responses suggested they
would.54 Moreover, the response options capture only crude jumps. A respon-
dent who might tolerate up to 2,000 or even 4,000 casualties but not 5,000 is
coded as accepting “at least 1,000 casualties” in our data.
Third, even with this biased estimator, the public shows more casualty toler-
ance than the conventional wisdom suggests. Finally, consistent with our ex-
pectations from the aggregate data analysis, our data indicate that public
casualty tolerance actually rose between June and October 2004. This increase
occurred despite the massive media coverage given to passing the threshold of
1,000 U.S. combat deaths in Iraq. Speciªcally, in October, 50 percent of the re-
spondents stated that they would be willing to tolerate 1,500 U.S. military
deaths, whereas only 44 percent expressed that view in June.
These summary results tell an important and interesting story, but the data
are even more valuable as a tool for tapping into the microfoundations of pub-
lic attitudes on casualties: How does the public form its attitudes on casualties,
and which factors are the most important?
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53. For an account of question wording effects and the use of hypothetical scenarios to measure
casualty tolerance, see Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles.
54. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is sunk-costs thinking on the part of the re-
spondents. That is, as the United States pays higher costs in Iraq, the public may become more de-































































































































































































































































































































































































































analyzing individual attitudes toward casualty tolerance
The results of our individual-level analysis of public tolerance for casualties in
Iraq in October 2004 are displayed in Table 4. We use ordered logit, which is
analogous to linear regression, but is the most appropriate statistical method
for analyzing an ordinally ranked dependent variable when the thresholds be-
tween categories are not evenly spaced. The results provide strong support for
each of our expectations regarding the nature of the U.S. public’s tolerance for
casualties. Interpretation of the speciªc coefªcients requires some care because
of the interaction between perceived rightness or wrongness of the war and ex-
pected success and tolerance for costs, but a careful review of the coefªcients
indicates that our interactive model of the “rightness” of the war and expecta-
tions of success has a signiªcant impact on tolerance for casualties.55
The coefªcient for respondents’ attitudes about whether President Bush did
the right thing represents the impact of respondents’ views regarding the
rightness of the war on their tolerance for casualties when respondents believe
that the United States is not very likely to succeed. Similarly, the coefªcient for
respondents’ attitudes about whether the United States is likely to succeed in
Iraq represents the impact that expectations of success have on respondents’
tolerance for casualties when they strongly disapprove of the president’s deci-
sion to go to war. As expected, the coefªcient for expectations of success is
larger than the coefªcient for the justiªcation of the war. A chi-squared test
reveals that this difference is statistically signiªcant (chi  13.04, 1 d.f.,
p  0.001). This result indicates that expectations about victory have a greater
impact on casualty tolerance when respondents are skeptical about the
justiªcation of the war than their views about the rightness of the war have
when they are skeptical about victory.
Respondents who are skeptical of the rightness of the war yet expect the
United States to win may be willing to pay higher costs than those who believe
in the cause yet expect to lose, but the results in Table 4 also clearly indicate
that these attitudes interact in determining an individual’s tolerance for casu-
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55. There is no simple “goodness of ªt” measure for ordinal logit models. Pseudo r-squared mea-
sures vary widely and other intuitive measures such as the percentage of correct predictions are
also arbitrary. See Scott Demarchi, Christopher Gelpi, and Jeffrey Grynaviski, “Untangling Neural
Nets,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 371–378. The best available
measure of ªt for dichotomous logit or probit models is the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve, but this measure is not appropriate for polytomous dependent variables. If one uses
the model in Table 3 to make dichotomous predictions about whether respondents will fall in the
“window of opportunity” category (i.e., tolerate at least 1,500 U.S. deaths), the area under the ROC
curve in this model is a respectable 0.78 (95 percent conªdence interval 0.76 to 0.81).
alties. The coefªcient for the interaction term, “Right Thing x Success,” is posi-
tive and statistically signiªcant, indicating that each of our key variables—
views of the rightness of the war, and expectations of success—has a greater
impact on casualty tolerance as the other variable increases. That is, one’s ex-
pectations regarding success have a greater impact on casualty tolerance if one
believes that President Bush was right to attack Iraq than if one believes that
he was wrong to do so. Similarly, one’s views regarding the rightness of the
war have a greater impact on casualty tolerance if one expects the United
States to win the war than if one is skeptical of success.
Although our argument concerning the sources of casualty tolerance re-
ceives strong statistical support, so do the arguments made by Jentleson,
Larson, and Kull. Each of the control variables measuring perceptions of the
links between Iraq and the war on terror, perceptions of an elite consensus,
and support for international constraints on the U.S. use of force are statisti-
cally signiªcant in the expected direction. Speciªcally, both the belief that Iraq
Success Matters 33
Table 4. The Individual Sources of Public Tolerance for Casualties in Iraq, October 2004
Explanatory Variable Coefficient
Bush did the right thing 0.038
(0.27)
United States will succeed 0.582
(4.18)**
Right thing X will succeed 0.241
(3.64)**
Perceived elite consensus 0.645
(5.19)**
Oppose force without UN approval 0.333
(3.45)**













NOTE: Absolute value of t statistics appear in parentheses.
*significant at 5 percent; **significant at 1 percent
is a part of the war on terror and the belief that Democratic and Republican
leaders all support a continued U.S. presence in Iraq signiªcantly increase a
survey respondent’s casualty tolerance. On the other hand, the multilateralist
belief that the United States should delay using force until it obtains UN ap-
proval reduces casualty tolerance in this case.
Thus we ªnd statistical support for all four central arguments about the
sources of casualty tolerance. But how important are these attitudes relative to
one another? The substantive effects of the rightness of the war and expecta-
tions of success are displayed in Figure 2. The vertical axis represents the prob-
ability that a respondent would tolerate at least 1,500 casualties.
The axis running from left to right depicts changes in a respondent’s attitude
about the likelihood that the United States will succeed in Iraq, while the axis
running from the front of the ªgure to the back depicts changes in a respon-
dent’s attitude toward whether President Bush did the right thing in choosing
to use force against Iraq. The columns depicting predicted casualty tolerance
demonstrate the interactive nature of the relationship between these variables.
Not surprisingly, casualty tolerance is at its lowest point in the left-front “Viet-
nam syndrome” corner of Figure 2 when a respondent strongly disapproves of
the decision to attack and thinks the United States is not at all likely to suc-
ceed. Casualty tolerance is at its highest in the right-rear “Bush base” corner
when a respondent strongly approves of the decision to attack and thinks the
United States is very likely to succeed. But what the ªgure also demonstrates is
that the impact of each of these variables on an individual’s willingness to bear
costs and support the war varies dramatically. For example, in examining each
row of columns moving from front to back, one can see the impact that
changes in a respondent’s attitude toward the rightness of the war has on his
or her tolerance for casualties at each level different level of expectations re-
garding U.S. success. Similarly, if one examines each row of columns moving
from left to right, one can see that the impact of expectations of success de-
pends on the respondent’s level of approval for the initial attack.
Turning to the far left-hand column, one can see that there is virtually no
change in a respondent’s casualty tolerance as we move from the front to the
back of the ªgure. This row captures the effect of changes in a respondent’s at-
titude toward the rightness of the war when he or she believes that victory is
“not at all likely.” Under these circumstances, changes in one’s attitude about
whether President Bush “did the right thing” in attacking Iraq has no impact
on tolerance for casualties. Speciªcally, increasing a respondent’s support for
the justiªcation of the attack from “strongly disapprove” to “strongly ap-


























































prove” only increases the probability that a respondent will provide the Bush
administration with a window of opportunity to prosecute the war from 20
percent to 23 percent.
Moving to the far right-hand row, one can see that the impact of respon-
dent’s attitudes toward the rightness of the war becomes much more impor-
tant if the respondent is optimistic about the prospects for success. Our model
predicts a 50 percent chance that a respondent who “strongly disapproves” of
President Bush’s decision but still believes that the United States is “very
likely” to succeed will tolerate at least 1,500 casualties. In this case, however,
increasing the respondent’s view of Bush’s justiªcation for the war to
“strongly approve” strengthens the likelihood that he or she would tolerate at
least 1,500 casualties to more than 90 percent.
The same type of interactive relationship holds for the impact of expecta-
tions of success, but the relationship is stronger in this case. As the front row of
columns indicates, for a respondent who “strongly disapproves” of the deci-
sion to use force, increasing his or her optimism from “not at all likely” to suc-
ceed to “very likely” to succeed increases the probability that he or she will
tolerate at least 1,500 casualties from 20 percent to 50 percent. But if a respon-
dent already “strongly approves” of President Bush’s decision to attack, then
increasing his or her level of optimism from “not at all likely” to succeed to
“very likely” to succeed increases the probability that he or she will support a
window of opportunity from 23 percent to more than 90 percent.
So which attitude is more important: attitudes toward the rightness of the
attack, or those toward the likelihood of success? Both attitudes work together
in determining a respondent’s threshold for the tolerable human costs of war.
The results, however, indicate that—at the margin—attitudes toward expecta-
tions of success are more inºuential than attitudes toward the rightness or
wrongness of the conºict. The greater inºuence of expectations of success can
be seen in several places in Figure 2. First, it is illustrated through a compari-
son of the right-front and left-rear corners of the ªgure. By comparing the left-
rear and right-front columns, one can see that the “Pottery Barn” respondent—
skeptical of the justiªcation, but optimistic regarding success—has a 50 percent
chance of tolerating 1,500 casualties, whereas the “noble failure” respondent
has only a 23 percent chance.
One can also see the greater impact of expectations for success by examining
some of the intermediate columns. For example, our model predicts that no
matter what their views on the justiªcation of the war, a majority of survey re-
spondents will not tolerate at least 500/1,000 casualties if they believe that vic-
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tory is “not very likely” or “not at all likely.” Even among those who “strongly
approve” of the decision to attack, slightly less than 50 percent of such respon-
dents will tolerate 1,500 casualties if they think that victory is “not very likely.”
Expectations of success, however, have a considerably greater impact. Our
model predicts that 75 percent of respondents who “somewhat disapprove” of
President Bush’s decision to attack will nonetheless tolerate at least 1,500 U.S.
military deaths if they believe that victory is very likely. This implies that the
president can garner the support from a majority of those who are moderately
skeptical of the war’s justiªcation by persuading them that victory is very
likely.
Of course, these two attitudes are not the only factors determining a respon-
dent’s willingness to tolerate costs in war. As we noted above, we also ªnd
support for arguments made by Jentleson, Larson, and Kull. Substantive ef-
fects of these variables and the demographic controls are displayed in Table 5.
With regard to Jentleson’s contention that the principal policy objective is the
key to public support, we ªnd that those who believe that the war in Iraq is the
“central front” in the war on terrorism are 10 percent more likely to tolerate
1,500 casualties than those who believe that Iraq is a distraction from the war
on terror. The perception of an elite consensus supporting U.S. troops in Iraq
also increases the likelihood that a respondent will tolerate 1,500 combat
deaths by 14 percent. Finally, consistent with Kull’s emphasis on multilateral-
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Change in Probability of
Tolerating At Least 1,500
U.S. Military Deaths
Perceived elite consensus No to yes 14%
Oppose force without UN approval No to yes 6%
Terror is PPO of Iraq war “Distraction” to
“central front”
10%
Gender Male to female 5%
Race White to nonwhite 16%
Age 18–29 to 60 years old 8%
Education level No high school to
college degree
18%
Party identification Strong Republican to
strong Democrat
11%
ism, we ªnd that respondents who believe that the U.S. president should re-
frain from using force until he obtains UN support were 6 percent less likely to
tolerate 1,500 U.S. military deaths.
Although the variables identiªed by Jentleson, Larson, and Kull all inºu-
ence the public’s tolerance for casualties, their substantive impact does not
approach the inºuence of the interaction of the rightness of the war and expec-
tations of success depicted in Figure 1. Whereas other factors may bump the
proportion of respondents who are in the window of opportunity up or down
by 10 percent to 20 percent, the interaction of rightness and success can have as
much as a 70 percent shift up or down in the proportion of respondents in the
window. Once we account for this interaction, other factors recede in relative
importance.
These results do not necessarily imply, however, that the overall impact of
the PPO, perceived elite consensus, and multilateralism are minimal. The ef-
fects displayed in Table 5 are estimated on the assumption that attitudes to-
ward the rightness of the war and expectations of success remain constant.
Thus our results could indicate that variables such as PPO, perceived elite con-
sensus, and multilateralism inºuence casualty tolerance indirectly through
their impact on attitudes toward the rightness of the war and its prospects for
success.56
A number of demographic factors also had a signiªcant impact on the pub-
lic’s tolerance for casualties.57 With one exception, these effects were in the di-
rection one would expect from intuition and previous research, but none of
these effects approach the substantive importance of a respondent’s expected
value calculation regarding the tolerable cost of the war.
First, somewhat surprisingly, respondents older than ªfty-nine are about 13
percent more likely to tolerate at least 1,500 casualties than respondents youn-
ger than thirty.58 This effect is robust across our nine waves of surveys, but it
differs from previous ªndings on the impact of age.59 Second, we ªnd that
women are about 6 percent less likely than men to support a window of op-
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56. For an examination of this issue, see Gelpi, Feaver, and Reiºer, “Paying the Human Costs of
War.”
57. Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles.
58. Our measure divides respondents into four age categories: 18–29, 30–44, 45–59, and over 59.
59. Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles. We can only speculate about what may have caused a
change in the impact of age on casualty tolerance. One thought is that the possibility of reinstating
the draft arose as an issue in the 2004 presidential campaign. Although both candidates rejected
the need for a draft, many young voters appeared fearful regarding the possibility.
portunity for continuing the war.60 Third, we ªnd that minorities are about 15
percent less likely than white respondents to tolerate at least 1,500 casualties. It
is worth noting, however, that while demographic patterns regarding casualty
tolerance such as the gender gap are consistent across a variety of conºicts, mi-
nority respondents appear to be less supportive of some wars and more sup-
portive of others.61 Education also has a signiªcant impact on the public’s
tolerance for casualties in Iraq; a college-educated respondent is about 20 per-
cent more likely than a respondent who has not completed high school to tol-
erate at least 1,500 casualties in Iraq.62 Finally, and perhaps not surprisingly,
party identiªcation has a signiªcant impact on casualty tolerance—especially
in the midst of an election year. Debates over the war in Iraq have often been
depicted as highly—if not predominantly—partisan contests. If one makes a
simple comparison of partisanship and casualty tolerance, one ªnds very
strong effects. For example, our data indicate that more than 83 percent of our
respondents who identify as Republican or leaning Republican stated that
they would be willing to tolerate at least 1,500 casualties in October 2004.63 But
less than 35 percent of those who identiªed as Democratic or leaning Demo-
cratic stated that they would be willing to tolerate that many casualties.
Describing such partisan differences, however, is not the same as explaining
them. Much of the reason for the deep partisan divide over the war in Iraq is
not because of party loyalty per se. Instead, these differences in tolerance for
war costs are largely a result of differing estimations among Democrats and
Republicans about the underlying questions about the rightness or wrongness
of the war and expectations of success. Once we account for respondents’
views regarding the rightness of the war and their expectations for success,
partisanship has only a modest impact on casualty tolerance. A respondent
who identiªed him or herself as “strongly Democratic” is only about 10 per-
cent less likely to tolerate at least 1,500 U.S. casualties than if he or she had
identiªed as “strongly Republican”—holding constant the respondent’s views




62. Education level is coded into four categories: less than a high school diploma, completed high
school, some college, and bachelor’s or higher degree.
63. We code party identiªcation as a seven-category variable with the following labels: strong Re-
publican, not strong Republican, leans Republican, undecided/independent, leans Democrat, not
strong Democrat, strong Democrat.
64. This result suggests that support for the war and for President Bush may be related, but dis-
Of course, like the PPO, perceived elite consensus, and multilateralism, par-
tisanship may be a key factor in determining those underlying values. Parti-
sanship is especially important in shaping respondent’s attitudes regarding
whether President Bush did the right thing in choosing to attack Iraq. Nearly
60 percent of our respondents who identiªed as “Republican” or “leaning Re-
publican” stated that they “strongly approved” of the president’s decision to
attack. Slightly more than 90 percent stated that they either “strongly” or
“somewhat approved.” Only about 40 percent of Democrats “strongly” or
“somewhat approved.” The pattern is similar, but not as strong, with regard to
expectations of success.
Finally, the results in Table 4 describe the structure of public attitudes to-
ward casualties in October 2004. But how robust is this structure? To ensure
that the process we are observing is robust over time, we performed a similar
analysis across the other eight waves of surveys from October 2003. Unfortu-
nately, we were unable to collect data on the control variables for the Jentleson,
Larson, and Kull arguments, but we can demonstrate the robustness of the
causal process we hypothesize. Analyses of the other survey waves are dis-
played in an appendix. The coefªcients for all the key variables of interest re-
main very stable across this period, indicating that our results are indeed
robust.
How Does the U.S. Public Deªne and Measure Success in Iraq?
Across a number of surveys, using a variety of methods on both aggregate and
individual-level data, the same consistent conclusion emerges: public expecta-
tions of success are central in determining public support for paying the hu-
man costs of war. This helps to explain why U.S. public support for the war in
Iraq remained fairly robust, despite an unexpectedly bloody and long counter-
insurgency, and despite serious doubts being raised about several of the chief
justiªcations for the war: to wit, Americans remained fairly optimistic about
the prospects for success in Iraq. But the central role of “expectations of suc-
cess” begs the obvious next question: How does the public deªne and measure
success in Iraq? Perhaps the public measures success in terms of body bags, in
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tinct, attitudes. See Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reiºer, and Peter Feaver, “Iraq the Vote: Retrospective
and Prospective Foreign Policy Judgments, Candidate Choice, and Casualty Tolerance,” Duke
University, 2005.
which case our argument is circular and the conventional wisdom is largely
correct.
To address this issue, beginning in February 2004, we followed up our ex-
pectations of success question with several additional questions probing the
meaning and measurement of success. We asked respondents what success
meant to them, based on a range of possible answers that were prominent in
public discussions. Table 6 presents the results to this question.
Several remarkable patterns emerge. First, the responses to the question of
the deªnition of success are very stable, astonishingly so when one considers
that these responses come from seven different national samples polled over
ªve turbulent months. A “stable and democratic government” was always the
ªrst choice, followed closely by “Iraqis provide for their own security” and
“Iraqis able to live peaceful, normal everyday lives.” Second, the ªndings
strongly suggest that the U.S. public moved on from the WMD and terrorism
arguments even as events on the ground moved past those casus belli as well.
The public did not treat the apparent absence of WMD stockpiles as a sign that
it was time to declare victory and go home. On the contrary, the public moved
on to deªne success in prospective terms that had relevance to the Iraqi situa-
tion as it stood in the winter and spring of 2004. Third, the ªndings suggest
that the public may have taken its cues on deªning success from the Bush ad-
ministration, which was itself shifting its rhetorical emphasis from the WMD
argument to the importance of establishing a stable democracy in the Middle
East.65
We also asked respondents how they believed one could best judge whether
the United States is on a path toward success. That is, we asked respondents
what measures they use to track and estimate future success, again directing
respondents to choose from a list of plausible factors. Table 7 presents the
results to these questions.
As with deªnitions of success, the results on tracking success were remark-
ably stable over the seven polling waves, with one important exception. Al-
though the relative rankings never changed, the primary indicator, “whether
Iraqis are cooperating with U.S. authorities and not protecting terrorists and
insurgents,” increased markedly in prominence as time progressed. This shift
is especially noteworthy because it may help to explain both the erosion of
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65. Dana Milbank and Mike Allen, “U.S. Shifts Rhetoric on Its Goals in Iraq,” Washington Post, Au-
gust 1, 2003.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































conªdence in the spring of 2004 and its stabilization during the summer and
fall. The Fallujah and Sadr uprisings that began in mid-March 2004 were dra-
matic signs that the coalition had not won Sunni hearts and minds, and that it
might be in danger of losing a key Shiite constituency as well. Moreover, this
ominous view was compounded by reports that the Iraqi security forces
trained by the coalition to take over the policing function failed spectacularly
in that job.66 But the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq and the creation of an Iraqi
government appear to have stemmed this tide—at least for a time.
Most important, these results show that our model of casualty tolerance
does not rest on a circular argument. The American public does not measure
success in terms of whether U.S. soldiers are being killed or wounded nor
whether the terrorists and insurgents are being killed or wounded. The mea-
sures adopted by the public are rather different, and indeed come closer to the
winning-the-hearts-and-minds idea that most experts (and Bush administra-
tion rhetoric) would identify as the critical factor.67
Conclusion
The political campaign season of 2003–04 provides an unusually good oppor-
tunity to examine the American public’s tolerance for paying the human costs
of war. Our ªndings challenge the conventional wisdom on public opinion
and U.S. foreign policy, but corroborate much of what other academic studies
have found. As John Mueller would expect, public opinion does “harden” to
the costs of war as the conºict drags on. Contrary to Mueller’s expectations,
however, public support for President Bush has not declined inexorably with
U.S. casualties. Instead, our analysis shows that the impact of casualties on
public approval for the president has varied dramatically between the “major
combat,” “occupation,” and “sovereign Iraq” phases of the war.
What can explain this variation in public tolerance for casualties? Consistent
with much of the recent work on public opinion in wartime, our study ªnds
that members of the public appear to be engaging in simple but clear calcula-
tions about the expected value of continuing to engage in armed conºict. That
is, individuals make judgments about the potential beneªts of the conºict and
weight those potential gains by the probability that their government will be
able to achieve them.
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66. Richard Sisk, “Iraqis Now Fight Alongside U.S.,” New York Daily News, May 15, 2004.
67. Public attitudes and elite rhetoric are clearly correlated in this case, but we cannot determine
the direction of causal inºuence.
More speciªcally, our ªndings suggest that believing the war was the right
thing to do combines with expectations of success to determine an individual’s
tolerance for the human costs of war. Once one takes into account the interac-
tion of these two attitudes, other prominent variables in the literature have
only a modest direct impact on casualty tolerance. This interaction effect even
outweighs the independent impact of partisanship. Rather than implying that
those other factors are not important, however, it seems likely that many of the
variables identiªed in the literature—such as the partisan cues, primary policy
objective, elite consensus, and multilateral support—may be most important
through their impact on respondent’s views about the rightness of the war and
the prospects for success.
Although both the “rightness” of the war and expectations of success are im-
portant, our data and analyses indicate that success appears to be the more im-
portant factor in this relationship.68 Not only do expectations of success have a
larger marginal impact on casualty tolerance, but the public also has remained
optimistic about success even though it has been divided regarding the justi-
ªcation for the war.
Furthermore, the public does not measure success in terms of body bags. On
the contrary, the public claimed to focus on whether the coalition was in fact
winning over the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, as measured by Iraqi
willingness to cooperate with coalition forces. The high correspondence be-
tween public responses and the Bush administration’s rhetoric in this area
suggests that leadership may be a key component.
U.S. troops remain engaged in ªghting in Iraq and continue to take casual-
ties. The Bush administration remains adamant that it will not cut and run in
Iraq, but it is facing increasing domestic pressure at home to do just that. The
debate at the elite and public levels is getting more caustic, and on a number of
questions the public has turned more negative on the war. But the key trade-
off for the administration is the public’s willingness to keep ªghting versus the
public’s demand to pull out of Iraq regardless of the consequences. This bal-
ance still seems to tilt in favor of the war. Our model says it will continue to tilt
that way so long as the public believes that the United States will achieve vic-
tory. If the public ever loses that underlying optimism, then the administration
will ªnd continuation of the war politically untenable.
Success Matters 45
68. The expectation of success is the most important source of casualty tolerance, but our analyses,
presented elsewhere, ªnd that beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of the conºict matters
more for other factors such as presidential vote choice. See Gelpi, Reiºer, and Feaver, “Iraq the
Vote,” http://www.duke.edu/~gelpi/IraqtheVote.pdf.
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